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Abstract
Empirical evaluation of policies to mitigate climate change has been largely
confined to the application of discounted utilitarianism (DU). DU is contro-
versial, both due to the conditions through which it is justified and due to its
consequences for climate policies, where the discounting of future utility gains
from present abatement efforts makes it harder for such measures to justify
their present costs. In this paper, we propose sustainable discounted utilitari-
anism (SDU) as an alternative principle for evaluation of climate policy. Unlike
undiscounted utilitarianism, which always assigns zero relative weight to present
utility, SDU is an axiomatically based criterion, which departs from DU by as-
signing zero weight to present utility if and only if the present is better off than
the future. Using the DICE integrated assessment model to run risk analysis,
we show that it is possible for the future to be worse off than the present along
a ‘business as usual’ development path. Consequently SDU and DU differ, and
willingness to pay for emissions reductions is (sometimes significantly) higher
under SDU than under DU. Under SDU, stringent schedules of emissions re-
ductions increase social welfare, even for a relatively high utility discount rate.
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1 Introduction
Empirical evaluation of policies to mitigate climate change has been largely confined
to the application of discounted utilitarianism (DU). DU means that one stream of
consumption is deemed better than another if and only if it generates a higher sum
of utilities discounted by a constant and positive per period utility discount rate ρ.
In spite of its prevalence, DU is controversial, both due to the conditions through
which it is justified and due to its consequences for choice in economically relevant
situations, such as climate-change policy. As a matter of principle, DU gives less
weight to the utility of future generations and therefore treats generations in an
unequal manner. If one abstracts from the probability that the world will be coming
to an end, thereby assuming that any generation will appear with certainty, it is
natural to question whether it is fair to value the utility of future generations less
than that of the present one. This criticism has a long tradition dating back at
least as far as Ramsey (1928, p. 543), who argued that the practice of discounting
later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones “is ethically indefensible and arises
merely from the weakness of the imagination”.
When applied to evaluating climate policies, DU means that the future utility
gains of present abatement efforts are discounted, which makes it harder for such
measures to justify their present costs. This was one of the earliest findings in the
economic literature on climate change (cf. Cline, 1992; Nordhaus, 1991).
One way of treating generations equally is to evaluate policies according to undis-
counted utilitarianism, whereby the utility discount rate is set to zero so that future
utilities are summed without being discounted. This alternative was highlighted dur-
ing the debate following the publication of the Stern Review (2007), which, while
committed to DU, applied a utility discount rate of very nearly zero. However, such
a criterion (or DU with a near-zero utility discount rate) may contradict our ethical
intuitions if used to evaluate all investments, as it is prone to impose heavy sacrifices
on the present generation for the benefit of future generations that are likely to be
much better off (Arrow, 1999; Dasgupta, 2007; Mirrlees, 1967; Rawls, 1971). The
reason for this weakness of undiscounted utilitarianism is that it assigns zero relative
weight to present utility under all circumstances, i.e. even when the present is worse
off than the future.
Sustainable discounted utilitarianism (SDU), proposed by Asheim and Mitra
(2010), avoids the pitfalls of DU (which is too willing to sacrifice future genera-
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tions) and undiscounted utilitarianism (which is too willing to sacrifice the present
generation).
SDU departs from DU by placing the additional constraint on social welfare
evaluation that the utility discount rate is set to zero if present utility exceeds future
welfare.1 Hence, in this case – and only in this case – is zero relative weight as-
signed to present utility. For example, if the future consequences of climate change
entail that present utility exceeds future welfare, then SDU takes into account the fu-
ture welfare benefits of present mitigation efforts, while ignoring their current costs.
Therefore, if there is a non-negligible probability that climate change will undermine
future wellbeing, then SDU promotes present action more than DU. However, SDU
coincides with DU with a positive utility discount rate if the future will for sure be
better off than the present in spite of climate change.
If the future will be better off than the present, then additional present sacri-
fice for the benefit of the future may increase the undiscounted sum of present and
future utilities. It also increases the verge between present and future wellbeing,
thus making the intergenerational distribution more unequal. Therefore, it seems
uncontroversial to allow a trade-off between present and future wellbeing in such
circumstances. However, if the future will be worse off than the present, then addi-
tional present sacrifice leading to a uniform increase of future wellbeing increases the
undiscounted sum of present and future utilities and decreases inequality. Hence,
such a transfer from the present to the future is desirable both from a utilitarian
and egalitarian perspective. This is the ethical underpinning for a condition called
“Hammond Equity for the Future”, which gives priority to the future in conflicts
where the future is worse off than the present.
“Hammond Equity for the Future” is the key condition in the axiomatic basis for
SDU, as investigated by Asheim et al. (2012). SDU also satisfies Chichilnisky’s (1996)
“No Dictatorship of the Present”. In contrast, DU is in conflict both with “Hammond
Equity for the Future”, as it allows a trade-off between present and future wellbeing
even when the present is better off than the future, and “No Dictatorship of the
Present”, as the ranking of DU (on the set of bounded streams) does not depend on
what happens beyond some finite future point in time.
Compared to DU, imposing “Hammond Equity for the Future” comes at the cost
1This statement presupposes that welfare is normalised in a way that allows for meaningful
comparison of utility derived from present consumption with welfare derived from the future con-
sumption stream. In Section 2 we explain how we ensure this.
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of (i) removing sensitivity to the interests of the present if the present is better off
than the future and (ii) relaxing to the set of non-decreasing streams the property
that the trade-off between wellbeing in the first two periods be separable from the
remainder of the stream. Regarding (i), there is a large literature, starting with
Diamond (1965), which has established a conflict between imposing equity conditions
(like equal treatment and “Hammond Equity for the Future”) on the one hand, and
remaining sensitive to the interests of every generation on the other. Asheim et
al. (2012, Section 4) present a formal analysis showing how imposing on the set of
all streams the separability property of DU mentioned under (ii) is in conflict with
equity conditions that respect the interests of future generations.
The present paper proposes SDU as an alternative criterion to DU for the evalu-
ation of climate abatement policies, and it seeks to illustrate that substituting SDU
for DU matters for empirical evaluation of such policies. We do so by considering
the DICE integrated assessment model, built by William Nordhaus, but where we
run risk analysis, including alternative specifications for the important parameters
determining the climate sensitivity and damage function. Weitzman (2009, 2010a,b)
in particular has raised doubt concerning the climate sensitivity and damage func-
tion used in the standard DICE model. Our alternative specifications lead to a
non-negligible probability that some generation is better off than its descendants, in
which case adopting SDU instead of DU matters for the evaluation, so much so that
we are able to show aggressive emissions abatement increases social welfare under
SDU, even when the utility discount rate is relatively high. By contrast, we confirm
that such abatement policies fail to increase social welfare under DU. We also show
that the optimal abatement policy is more stringent under SDU than DU.
Our analysis is ethical in nature, asking what our generation as a collective should
do to serve the interests of all generations from an impartial perspective. This is
different from taking a strategic perspective, asking what contemporary countries or
individuals should do to serve their own interests when such actions influence the
future strategic actions of other countries and individuals. Nevertheless, since SDU
bridges the gap between DU and undiscounted utilitarianism, we believe it is realistic
to suggest that its recommendations are of interest for current decision-makers.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present formally the concept
of SDU. While Asheim and Mitra (2010) have already done so in a deterministic
setting and without explicit consideration of population growth, empirical evaluation
of climate policies does not permit either of these simplifications, so Section 2 extends
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SDU to variable population and uncertainty. In Section 3 we present risk analysis
with DICE, discussing in particular our choice of climate sensitivity and damage
function, before in Section 4 reporting the results from our analysis. As we discuss
in the concluding Section 5, the present paper should be considered a first effort
in combining recent advances in axiomatic theories of intertemporal social choice
(for a survey, see Asheim, 2010) with empirical evaluation of climate-change policies.
Nevertheless, we claim that our analysis is strongly indicative of the importance of
broadening the basis of climate-policy evaluation from DU to SDU and beyond.
2 What is Sustainable Discounted Utilitarianism?
In the empirical part of this paper we consider only consumption streams which
eventually become constant.2 This setting simplifies the presentation of SDU, and
we refer the reader to Asheim and Mitra (2010) for the more general treatment.
Let ct > 0 denote consumption in period t, and let tc = (ct, . . . , cτ , . . . ) be an
infinite stream of consumption, where there exists T ≥ t such that cτ = cT for all
τ ≥ T . A consumption stream tc is called egalitarian if cτ = ct for all τ ≥ t.
Utility in a period is derived from consumption in that period alone. The utility
function U is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuous and
continuously differentiable for c > 0 with U ′(c) → ∞ as c → 0. Clearly, any utility
function with constant relative inequality aversion satisfies these assumptions.
Let ρ > 0 denote the utility discount rate to be used under DU, and under SDU
provided present utility does not exceed future welfare. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) denote the
corresponding utility discount factor. The relation between ρ and δ is given by
δ =
1
1 + ρ
. (1)
Note that setting the utility discount rate to 0 corresponds to setting the utility
discount factor to 1; doing so leads to zero relative weight on present utility. The
theoretical presentation of SDU in this section is facilitated by using the utility
discount factor δ, while the numerical results in Section 4 are easier to interpret in
terms of the utility discount rate ρ. Keeping in mind eq. (1) (and eq. (3) in the case
of variable population analysed in subsection 2.1), this should not create confusion.
2We use a modelling horizon from 2005 to 2395 and assume that consumption remains at the
2395 level thereafter.
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In the axiomatic analysis of Asheim and Mitra (2010), time periods correspond
to non-overlapping generations assumed to follow each other in sequence. In the
empirical analysis of this paper, time periods are shorter, set to ten years (given
by the time-step of the DICE model). As long as the discount factor is properly
adjusted to reflect a plausible trade-off between present utility and future welfare,
this choice of period length does not matter.
With overlapping generations, discounting from an ethical perspective between
different generations should be differentiated from the self-interested discounting that
people do within their own lifetimes, and our analysis – following most literature on
climate-policy evaluation – does not reflect the need to do such differentiation.
Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), the social welfare function (SWF) w defined by
w(tc) = (1− δ)
∑∞
τ=t
δτ−tU(cτ ) (2)
is the discounted utilitarian (DU) SWF. Multiplying by 1− δ ensures that the util-
ity weights
(
1− δ, (1− δ)δ, (1− δ)δ2, . . . ) add up to one. Such a normalisation is
essential for the analysis of this paper, as it makes the utility of each generation
comparable to the welfare of the stream.
The DU SWF is well-defined for the set of consumption streams which eventually
become constant. Furthermore, on this set, it is characterized by
w(tc) = (1− δ)U(ct) + δw(t+1c) (w.1)
w(tc) = U(ct) if tc is egalitarian . (w.2)
Clearly, (2) implies (w.1) and (w.2). Conversely, for any 0c = (c0, . . . , cτ , . . . ) with
cτ = cT for all τ ≥ T , it follows from (w.2) that
w(T c) = U(cT ) = (1− δ)
∑∞
τ=T
δτ−TU(cτ ) .
Repeated use of (w.1) for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1, 0, now yields (2) for t = 0.
The sustainable discounted utilitarian (SDU) SWF modifies DU by requiring that
an SDU SWF not be sensitive to the interests of the present generation if the present
is better off than the future:
W (tc) =
 (1− δ)U(ct) + δW (t+1c) if U(ct) ≤W (t+1c)W (t+1c) if U(ct) > W (t+1c) , (W.1)
W (tc) = U(ct) if tc is egalitarian . (W.2)
5
Condition (W.1) means that future utilities are not discounted (the discount factor
is set to 1; the utility discount rate is set to 0) if the present is better off than the
future. In this case, present utility is given zero weight. The utility weights are still
of the form
(
1− δ, (1− δ)δ, (1− δ)δ2, . . . ) if generations with zero utility weight are
left out, implying that the utility weights add up to one also for the SDU SWF. This
means that the utility of each generation is comparable to the welfare of the stream
and makes the comparison between U(ct) and W (t+1c) meaningful and independent
of the period length. In particular, the welfare of an egalitarian stream is equal to
the utility of the constant level of consumption, as specified by condition (W.2).
For any 0c = (c0, . . . , cτ , . . . ) with cτ = cT for all τ ≥ T , it follows from (W.2)
that W (T c) = U(cT ). Repeated use of (W.1) for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1, 0, now
allows us to recursively calculate W (T−1c), W (T−2c), and so on, ending up with
W (0c). Hence, on our domain of eventually constant consumption streams, the SDU
SWF is uniquely determined.
For given utility discount factor δ, the concavity of the U -function and W (tc)
being the minimum of (1−δ)U(ct)+δW (t+1c) andW (t+1c) (cf. (W.1)) both express
a preference for consumption smoothing over time. The Ramsey model of optimal
growth can be used to show that these instruments are not redundant (see Asheim
and Mitra, 2010, Section 4). If initial capital productivity is higher than the one
corresponding to the modified Golden Rule, then the SDU-optimal stream coincides
with the increasing DU-optimal stream and the concavity of the U -function smooths
consumption as for the DU-optimal stream. However, if initial capital productivity
is lower than the one corresponding to the modified Golden Rule, then (W.1) implies
that the SDU-optimal stream coincides with the efficient egalitarian stream. For
such initial conditions, DU leads to a decreasing optimal stream for any choice of
strictly increasing and strictly concave U -function, thereby representing preferences
in conflict with the condition of “Hammond Equity for the Future”.
The following proposition establishes as a general result that SDU welfare coin-
cides with DU welfare on the set of non-decreasing streams. Also, it shows that SDU
welfare is a non-decreasing function of time and bounded above by DU welfare.
Proposition 1 Assume that 0c is eventually constant.
(i) For all t ≥ 0, W (0c) ≤W (tc) ≤ w(tc)
(ii) If 0c is non-decreasing, then W (0c) = w(0c).
6
Proof. This is a special case of Asheim and Mitra (2010, Proposition 2).
Part (ii) means that SDU welfare differs from DU welfare only if the consumption
stream is not non-decreasing. Hence, existence of some t ≥ 0 such that ct > ct+1
is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for SDU welfare being strictly below DU
welfare, and emphasis will be placed on this possibility in the empirical analysis.
On the set of non-increasing streams, SDU coincides with both maximin and nu-
merically representable criteria that depend only on the streams’ limiting properties.
While such criteria satisfy the condition of “Hammond Equity for the Future” by giv-
ing priority to the future in conflicts where the future is worse off than the present,
they are extremely insensitive of the interests of generations and yield very different
conclusions from SDU for streams that are not non-increasing. In particular, max-
imin assigns no weight to any generation but the worst off, while criteria that depend
on the limiting properties assign no weight to any finite subset of generations.
The stationary equivalent consumption c¯ of a consumption stream 0c is the con-
sumption level c¯, which if held constant yields the same welfare as the consumption
stream 0c. By (w.2), the stationary equivalent consumption c¯ of a consumption
stream 0c under DU satisfies U(c¯) = w(0c), or since U is strictly increasing:
c¯ = U−1
(
w(0c)
)
.
By (W.2), the stationary equivalent consumption c¯ of a consumption stream 0c under
SDU satisfies U(c¯) = W (0c), or since U is strictly increasing:
c¯ = U−1
(
W (0c)
)
.
We use the stationary equivalent consumption to express non-marginal welfare dif-
ferences in consumption terms (more on this in Section 4).
Asheim and Mitra (2010) introduce SDU in a deterministic setting where popu-
lation growth is not explicitly discussed. Application of SDU to climate change, and
indeed to a number of other policy issues, requires explicit treatment of population
growth and uncertainty, however, and we turn to these issues now.
2.1 Variable population
In Asheim and Mitra (2010, p. 150), consumption in period t is interpreted as “a non-
negative indicator of the wellbeing of generation t”. However, how do we compare
the wellbeing of the present generation with the wellbeing of future generations if
population size changes over time?
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One possibility is to represent the wellbeing of each generation by the product
of population size and the utility derived from per-capita consumption. This is the
position of ‘classical utilitarianism’. An alternative position is to let the wellbeing
of each generation depend only on per-capita consumption; this is called ‘average
utilitarianism’. There is a substantial literature taking a stance in favour of classical
utilitarianism (see, e.g. Meade, 1955; Mirrlees, 1967; Dasgupta, 2001; Blackorby et
al., 2005). Moreover, this position is standard in the empirical literature on climate-
policy evaluation. Against this background we apply classical utilitarianism in this
paper, while carefully observing the need to make meaningful comparisons of present
utility with future welfare when developing SDU within this position.
Let ct = Ct/Nt be per capita consumption at time t, where population Nt varies
exogenously with time. Classical DU welfare at time t, wt, depends on
(i) the stream of per-capita consumption tc = (ct, . . . , cτ , . . . ),
(ii) the development of population tN = (Nt, . . . , Nτ , . . . ), and
(iii) the utility discount factor
β =
1
1 + ρ
(3)
(where ρ > 0 so that β ∈ (0, 1)) used to discount the product of population
size and the utility derived from per-capita consumption.
It can be expressed by
wt =
∑∞
τ=tβ
τNτU(cτ )∑∞
τ=tβ
τNτ
, (4)
where the normalisation ensures that the weights assigned to utility derived from
per-capita consumption add up to one when summed over all present and future
individuals. In particular, the DU welfare of an egalitarian stream, with per-capita
consumption being c at all times, equals U(c). Hence, DU welfare is made comparable
to the utility derived from per-capita consumption when being expressed by (4).
By defining a time-dependent population-adjusted utility discount factor δt by
δt =
∑∞
τ=t+1β
τNτ∑∞
τ=tβ
τNτ
= 1− β
tNt∑∞
τ=tβ
τNτ
, (5)
we get the following recursive formula for classical DU welfare:
wt =
βtNtU(ct)∑∞
τ=tβ
τNτ
+
∑∞
τ=t+1β
τNτU(cτ )∑∞
τ=tβ
τNτ
= (1− δt)U(ct) + δtwt+1 . (6)
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If 0c = (c0, . . . , cτ , . . . ) is an infinite stream of per-capita consumption, where there
exists T ≥ 0 such that cτ = cT for all τ ≥ T , then wT = U(cT ) combined with
repeated use of (6) allow us to calculate classical DU welfare at time 0.
Likewise, if 0c = (c0, . . . , cτ , . . . ) is an infinite stream of per-capita consumption,
with cτ = cT for all τ ≥ T , then WT = U(cT ) combined with repeated use of
Wt =
 (1− δt)U(ct) + δtWt+1 if U(ct) ≤Wt+1Wt+1 if U(ct) > Wt+1 (7)
allow us to calculate SDU welfare at time 0. It is also the case that with the recursive
formula (7) for SDU welfare, the weights assigned to utility derived from per-capita
consumption add up to one when summed over all present and future individuals.
Thus, the normalisation ensures that SDU welfare is comparable to the utility de-
rived from per-capita consumption, making the comparison between U(ct) andWt+1
meaningful.
The explicit algorithm defined by WT = U(cT ) and repeated use of (7), with δt
determined by (5), is used for calculating SDU welfare in the empirical analysis. It
follows from (5) that the population-adjusted utility discount factor δt
• equals the unadjusted utility discount factor β = 11+ρ if population is constant,
• exceeds β if there is positive population growth, and
• varies with time if population growth is not exponential.
2.2 Uncertainty
Now we turn to the analysis of uncertainty. To handle uncertainty, one can in
principle think of two polar approaches in a situation where there is a probabil-
ity distribution over consumption streams.3 One possibility is to adopt an ex post
approach by first valuing each realised consumption stream or realisation and then
assigning probability weights to the different realisations. An alternative is to adopt
an ex ante approach by first determining a certainty equivalent for each generation
and then valuing the stream of certainty equivalents. When applying SDU to un-
certainty, the choice between these approaches matters for policy evaluation: in the
context of climate change, the possibility of catastrophic consequences is assigned
3In the empirical part this corresponds to the empirical distribution of 250 or 1000 random draws
of a Latin Hypercube sample.
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more weight in the ex post approach where the valuation is done first within each
realisation.
This point can be shown formally under the simplifying assumption that the
utility function U not only expresses aversion to fluctuation, but also aversion to risk.
By abstracting from population growth and writing V (u,w) := min{(1−δ)u+δw,w}
for the function that aggregates present utility and future welfare, it follows from
(W.1) that W (tc) = V (U(ct),W (t+1c)). The ex post approach of first valuing each
realisation and then assigning probability weights to the different realisations yields
EW (0c˜) = EV (U(c˜0),W (1c˜)) = EV (U(c˜0), V (U(c˜1),W (2c˜))) = . . . ,
while the ex ante approach of first determining a certainty equivalent for each gen-
eration and then valuing the stream of certainty equivalents corresponds, in the case
where streams are constant from period T on, to using the algorithm defined byW aT =
EU(c˜T ) and repeated use of W at = V (EU(c˜t),W at+1) for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1, 0.
Since V is a concave function of u and w, it follows from Jensen’s inequality that
EV (U(c˜0),W (1c˜)) ≤ V (EU(c˜0),EW (1c˜)) ,
with strict inequality if both U(c0) < W (1c) and U(c0) > W (1c) are assigned positive
probability. The left-hand side is welfare EW (0c˜) in the ex post approach, while the
right-hand side can be seen to be a lower bound for welfare W a0 in the ex ante
approach. Hence, if the event that the present is worse off than the future and the
event that the present is better off than the future both have positive probabilities,
then welfare is lower when adopting the ex post approach. Note that the function
that aggregates present utility and future welfare is linear under DU, implying that
the two approaches are identical in this case. As explained by Fleurbaey (2010), the
issue arises exactly when a priority for the worse off is introduced; SDU does so by
giving priority to the future when the future is worse off than the present.
We have used the ex post approach for calculating SDU welfare in the empirical
analysis. While it remains a topic for future research to determine what axiomatic
basis exists for each of these two approaches – and thereby shed more light on which
one fits more naturally with SDU – we offer some remarks to justify our choice.
The ex ante approach entails that individuals are subjected to risk and evaluate
prospects by expected utility before the risk is resolved, and that social evaluation is
based on the expected utilities of the individuals. In addition to more general prob-
lems with the ex ante approach (see, e.g., Fleurbaey, 2010, p. 650, for an illustration
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in terms of climate change), there is a fundamental problem with this approach in
the case where future generations are subjected to risk: such ex ante individual eval-
uation is unavailable. Individuals belonging to future generations in a state where
climate change does not affect wellbeing have different identities from those in a
state where climate change significantly worsens their situation, and there is no ex-
pected utility of their wellbeing on which to base an ex ante social evaluation. In
short, in different uncertain states, individuals belonging to future generations must
be treated as different individuals.4
An ex post evaluation based on SDU when individuals in different states are
treated as different individuals must take into account the probability that present
utility might exceed future welfare by not assigning utility weight to present utility
in such states. This is exactly what we do in the empirical analysis.
In the empirical analysis we also make the assumption that the utility function U
not only expresses aversion to fluctuation, but also aversion to risk. It is of interest
to separate fluctuation aversion from risk aversion, but this is outside the scope of
the present paper. In any case, the identity between fluctuation aversion and risk
aversion has been standard in the empirical literature on climate-policy evaluation,
so our results will be easier to compare to previous studies in this way.
Adopting the ex post approach comes at a cost: it makes policy evaluation based
on SDU time-inconsistent.5 A simple example illustrates this issue. Consider two
policies. If policy A is chosen, then consequences are deterministic and consumption
is kept constant at a medium level: cm, with U(cm) = 1. If policy B is chosen, then
consumption is for sure equal to cm in periods 0, 1 and 2. However, the consequences
from period 3 onwards are stochastic. With probability 0.5, consumption thereafter
will be high: ch, with U(ch) = 5. With remaining probability 0.5, consumption there-
after will be low: c`, with U(c`) = 0. Let the utility discount factor, δ, equal 0.5.
The welfare of policy A equals 1, independently of when it is evaluated. The
welfare of policy B is the average of 5 in period 3, 3 in period 2, 2 in period 1 and 1.5
in period 0, on the one hand if the good outcome is realised, and 0, independently
of the time of evaluation, on the other hand if the bad outcome is realised. Thus,
4This statement holds in a non-overlapping generations model. With the ten year periods used
in the empirical analysis of this paper, people are subjected to risk within their own lifetimes. We
abstract from this since the intergenerational consequences seem more important. This is analogous
to abstracting from the self-interested discounting that people do within their own lifetimes.
5In principle, also the ex ante approach may lead to time-inconsistency; see Hammond (1989).
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the welfare of policy B equals 2.5 in period 3, 1.5 in period 2, 1 in period 1, and 0.75
in period 0. Hence, in period 0 policy evaluation favours policy A. However, if the
choice is delayed until period 2, then the ranking is reversed.
The reason for this reversal is that the excess utility of cm as compared to c` in
periods 0, 1, and 2 is “wasted” if the bad outcome is realised. This waste is reduced
as the date of evaluation is moved forward, thereby making the bad outcome less
disastrous and policy B relatively more attractive. Time-consistency can be restored
by taking into account the utility wasted by earlier generations. However, doing so
will instead lead to a possibly unattractive dependence on the “utilities of the dead”
(cf. Blackorby et al., 1995; Bommier and Zuber, 2008).
3 Risk analysis with DICE
In order to examine empirically the differences between climate policy evaluation
under SDU and DU, we employ the DICE integrated assessment model of the joint
climate-economy system, built by William Nordhaus (we adapt the 2007 version
of the model, described in Nordhaus, 2008). In brief, DICE couples a neoclassical
model of economic growth to a simple model of the climate system.6 Output of a
composite good is produced using aggregate capital and labour inputs, augmented by
exogenous total factor productivity (TFP) in a Cobb-Douglas production function.
However, industrial production is also associated with the emission of carbon dioxide,
which is an input to the simple climate model,7 resulting in radiative forcing of
the atmosphere and an increase in global mean temperature. The climate model
couples back to the economy by means of a so-called ‘damage function’, which is a
reduced-form polynomial equation associating a change in temperature with a loss
in utility, expressed in terms of equivalent output. The damage function in DICE
implicitly takes account of the economy and society’s capacity to adapt to climate
change, which reduces the amount of output lost for a given increase in global mean
temperature, so that the representative agent is left to choose how much to invest
in abating CO2 emissions from production. The model is globally aggregated and is
6IPCC (Houghton et al., 1997) coined the term ‘simple climate model’ to denote models, which
specify the atmosphere, surface and deep oceans as one-dimensional, uniformly mixed boxes, which
exchange heat and/or CO2 with each other. By contrast, atmosphere-ocean general circulation
models (AOGCMs), the most complex type of climate model, divide the atmosphere and ocean into
a detailed three-dimensional grid, with many longitudinal, latitudinal and vertical points.
7Alongside exogenous emissions of carbon dioxide from land use.
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resolved in decadal time steps from 2005 up to 2395.
DICE is described in full in Nordhaus (2008), and for the sake of brevity we focus
our exposition here on those parts of the model we have modified.8 Since uncertainty
is central to climate policy, we select a subset of eight of the most important param-
eters in DICE, and specify each as random. Table 1 lists these parameters and the
form and parameterisation of their probability distributions. In selecting these eight
parameters, we have followed the lead of Nordhaus’ (2008) own risk analysis. How-
ever, in the case of two parameters, we have chosen an alternative specification. They
describe the climate sensitivity and the curvature of the damage function, and we de-
vote special attention to them below. We use a standard, iso-elastic utility function,
and calculate classical utilitarian social welfare recursively, using eqs. (6) and (7) for
DU and SDU respectively. The probability distributions of the random parameters
are sampled using a Latin Hypercube, and social welfare is computed separately for
each draw and then weighted by its (identical) probability as described above.
The first four parameters in Table 1 play a role in determining CO2 emissions. Of
these four parameters, Kelly and Kolstad (2001) showed that growth in TFP and in
population are particularly important. The reason is that, in integrated assessment
models such as DICE, growth in CO2 emissions is proportional to growth in global
economic output, which in turn is determined in significant measure by productivity
growth and by the stock of labour. In addition, where a classical utilitarian SWF is
applied, the larger (smaller) is the population when the impacts of climate change
occur, the higher (lower) is the social valuation of climate damage. However, while
CO2 emissions are proportional to output, the proportion is usually assumed to
decrease over time due to changes in economic structure away from CO2-intensive
production activities, and to increases in the efficiency of output with respect to
CO2 emissions in a given activity. In DICE, this is achieved by virtue of a variable
representing the ratio of emissions/output, which decreases over time as a function
of a rate-of-decarbonisation parameter. A further check on industrial CO2 emissions
is provided in the long run by the finite total remaining stock of fossil fuels, which
is also treated here as an uncertain parameter.
The fifth uncertain parameter in Table 1 is the price of a so-called ‘backstop’ tech-
nology, which in the context of climate-change mitigation is the price of a technology
that is capable of completely nullifying CO2 emissions. In DICE, the backstop is
8We adapt the MS Excel version of the model, which is convenient for running risk analysis using
the @Risk and Riskoptimizer plug-ins.
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Table 1. Uncertain parameters for simulation of modified DICE-2007.
Parameter Units Functional Mean Standard Source
form deviation
Initial growth Per Normal 0.0092 0.004 Nordhaus
rate of TFP year (2008)
Asymptotic Millions Normal 8600 1892 Nordhaus
global population (2008)
Rate of Per Normal -0.007 0.002 Nordhaus
decarbonisation year (2008)
Total resources Billion tons Normal 6000 1200 Nordhaus
of fossil fuels of carbon (2008)
Price of back- US$ per ton of Normal 1170 468 Nordhaus
stop technology carbon replaced (2008)
Transfer coefficient Per Normal 0.189 0.017 Nordhaus
in carbon cycle decade (2008)
Climate ◦C per doubling of Log- 1.099* 0.3912* Weitzman
sensitivity atmospheric CO2 normal (2009)
Damage function Fraction of Normal 0.082 0.028 Own
coefficient α3 global output estimate
*In natural logarithm space.
deployed if the control rate on CO2 emissions reaches 100%, so it is conceptually the
marginal cost of the last unit of emissions abatement. Such a technology could most
plausibly be a zero-emissions energy technology such as solar or geothermal power.9
The backstop price starts very high (mean = US$1170/tC), but declines over time.
Hence it becomes an important determinant of the cost of abatement in the long
run.
The sixth and seventh parameters in Table 1 capture important uncertainties in
climate science. At a very high level of abstraction, one can distinguish between (i)
uncertainties in climate modelling that derive from the cycling of carbon between its
various ’sinks’ (the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the biosphere and the lithosphere),
which therefore render forecasts of the atmospheric stock of CO2 for a given pulse of
9It could also be a geo-engineering technology such as artificial trees to sequester atmospheric
CO2, except that DICE has exogenous emissions of CO2 from land use.
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emissions uncertain, and (ii) uncertainties in the relationship between a rising stock
of atmospheric CO2 and temperature. In DICE, the carbon cycle is represented by
a system of equations, each containing several parameters. Here, uncertainty about
the carbon cycle is captured in a tractable way by focussing on a parameter that
determines the proportion of CO2 in the atmosphere in a particular time period,
which dissolves into the upper ocean in the next period.
3.1 Climate sensitivity
Uncertainty about the relationship between atmospheric CO2 and temperature is
captured by a random climate-sensitivity parameter. The climate sensitivity is the
increase in global mean temperature, in equilibrium, that results from a doubling in
the atmospheric stock of CO2. In simple climate models, it is critical in determining
how fast and how far the planet is forecast to warm in response to emissions. The
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report compiled a number of recent estimates of the
climate sensitivity (IPCC, 2007). It concluded that the best estimate of the climate
sensitivity is 3◦C, that there is a greater than 66% chance of it falling in the range 2–
4.5◦C (the IPCC’s “likely” range), and a less than 10% chance of it being lower than
1.5◦C (“very unlikely”). This leaves around a 17% chance that the climate sensitivity
exceeds 4.5◦C, and indeed a critical feature of all 18 probability density functions
of the climate sensitivity compiled by IPCC is that they have a positive skew, with
a long tail of high estimates. These tails can be attributed to uncertainty about
feedbacks (Roe and Baker, 2007), related for example to clouds and water vapour,
and about the cooling effect of aerosols.
In Nordhaus’ (2008) risk analysis with DICE, the random climate-sensitivity
parameter is normally distributed with a mean of 3◦C and a standard deviation of
1.1◦C. Compared with the evidence compiled by IPCC, however, this distribution
may significantly underestimate the probability of very high values. For example, a
value of 6.3◦C, which is three standard deviations from the mean of Nordhaus’ normal
distribution, is assigned a probability of only around 0.1%, whereas several of the pdfs
in IPCC (2007) put the corresponding probability at 5–10%. Similarly, in his review
of the evidence, Weitzman (2009) considers that there is a 1% chance of the climate
sensitivity exceeding 10◦C. According to the above normal distribution, this is less
likely than a ‘six sigma’ event, so it has a probability of less than 10−7%. Therefore we
specify the random climate-sensitivity parameter as lognormally distributed. With
the parameterisation in Table 1, it can easily be verified that a value of at least
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6.3◦C, for example, is associated with a 3% probability.
3.2 The damage function
The final parameter in Table 1 is one element of the damage function linking tempera-
ture and utility-equivalent losses in output. In recent years, there has been increasing
focus in climate-change economics on this critical function (e.g. Weitzman, 2010a),
which is unsurprising when one considers that, without the damage function, the
accumulation of atmospheric CO2 has no consequence for social welfare. In many
past studies, including those with DICE, the approach has been to specify losses in
output as a quadratic function of global mean temperature:
Ω(T ) =
1
1 + α1Tt + α2T 2t
, (8)
where Ω, to keep our nomenclature consistent with Nordhaus (2008), is the propor-
tion of output lost at time t, T is the increase in global mean temperature over the
pre-industrial level, and α1 and α2 are coefficients.
The coefficients α1 and α2 are calibrated on the large literature devoted to es-
timating the cost of climate change in particular sectors of the economy, such as
agriculture, energy, and health (summarised in Parry et al., 2007). This literature
provides estimates of varying reliability and validity, but it can generally be concluded
that the loss in utility for warming of up to about 3◦C is relatively well constrained,
and is equivalent to a few percent of output. Unfortunately, what the impacts of
climate change will be for larger amounts of global warming remains largely in the
realm of guesswork (Weitzman, 2009), due to possible non-linearities in the biophys-
ical and socio-economic response to changes in climate variables, as well as possible
singularities in the climate system itself (e.g. a collapse in the Antarctic ice sheet,
or a shutdown in the ocean circulation), all of which are very poorly understood at
present. This points the spotlight at the functional form for damages.
There has never been any stronger justification for the assumption of quadratic
damages than the general supposition of a non-linear relationship, added to the fact
that quadratic functions are of a familiar form to economists, with a tractable linear
first derivative (i.e. the marginal benefit function of emissions reductions). However,
when extrapolated to large temperature levels, the implications of a quadratic func-
tion have recently been cast in doubt. Both Ackerman et al. (2010) and Weitzman
(2010b) have shown that, with Nordhaus’ (2008) calibration of eq. (8), 5◦C warming
results in a loss of utility equivalent to just 6% of output, despite such warming being
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equivalent to the difference between the present global mean temperature and the
temperature at the peak of the last ice age, while it takes around 18◦C of warming
for losses in utility to exceed the equivalent of 50% of output.
There are various ways to remedy what is increasingly regarded as an implausible
forecast (Ackerman et al., 2010; Stern Review, 2007; Weitzman, 2009). Following (8),
utility losses can be ramped up by increasing the coefficients α1 and α2, but only
at the expense of unrealistically large losses in utility for the initial 3◦C warming.
Conceptually, much follows from the specification of the utility function. Working
with a standard utility function whose sole argument is consumption of the composite
good, we can introduce a higher-order term into the damage function to capture
greater non-linearity, as Weitzman (2010b) does.10 We specify the following function:
Ω(T ) =
1
1 + α1Tt + α2T 2t + α˜3T
7
t
, (9)
where α˜3 is a normally distributed random coefficient with mean and standard devi-
ation reported in Table 1. The remaining coefficients α1 and α2 are as in Nordhaus
(2008). If α˜3 takes its mean value, 5◦C warming results in a loss of utility equiva-
lent to around 7% of output, while 50% of output is not lost until the global mean
temperature is roughly 11◦C above the pre-industrial level. Thus the mean value of
function (9) remains fairly conservative at high temperatures. However, when α˜3 is
three standard deviations larger than the mean, 5◦C warming triggers an output loss
of around 25% of output, and 50% of output is lost when warming reaches just 6◦C.
This is very close to the specification of Weitzman (2010b). Conversely, at three
standard deviations below the mean, α˜3 is small enough that function (9) virtually
collapses to function (8), so our risk analysis on the damage function can be said
to span the approaches taken by Nordhaus on the one hand and Weitzman on the
other.
4 Results
As reported in Section 2, a necessary, but insufficient, condition for SDU welfare to
be below DU welfare is that there exists some period t ≥ 0 such that ct > ct+1.
This period t has to be smaller than the model’s terminal period T , as we impose
constant consumption beyond T . Satisfying this condition will in general depend on
10The alternative is to specify utility as a function not only of consumption but also of environ-
mental quality directly, for example indexed by global mean warming.
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severe climate-change damage, since the DICE model, in line with other integrated
assessment models, predicts strong growth in production in the absence of such
damage. For example, when all the coefficients αi of the damage function are set
to zero, so that damages are ‘switched off’, global mean consumption per capita in
DICE is forecast to grow in real terms from US$6,667 in 2005, the base year, to
US$26,159 in 2105, and onwards to over US$80,000 in 2205.11 Hence the probability
that ct > ct+1 for 0 ≤ t < T may be low, but as long as it is not zero, SDU may lead
to a different evaluation of policies to cut CO2 emissions than will DU. Therefore we
begin our analysis of the modelling results by investigating the probability that per-
capita consumption is falling at some point over the modelling horizon, conditional
on the schedule of emissions cuts pursued.
To begin with, we examine three such climate-change policies. They are, first,
‘business as usual’, second, a schedule of emissions cuts to limit the atmospheric
concentration of CO2 to twice its pre-industrial level (560 parts per million, hereafter
referred to as the 2 CO2 policy), and, third, a more aggressive schedule of cuts to
limit the concentration of CO2 to only one-and-a-half times its pre-industrial level
(420ppm, hereafter referred to as the 1.5 CO2 policy). The latter two schedules, the
abatement schedules, have both been prominent in recent international negotiations
about climate policy. Figure 1 presents estimates of the probability that, for each
of these three policies, ct > ct+1 with respect to any two successive time periods
between 2005 and 2205. For this analysis, and the welfare evaluation of the policies
in Section 4.1 below, the Latin Hypercube sample comprises 1000 draws.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 shows that the probability of falling consumption per capita is positive,
but very small, under all three policies. Indeed, for the coming century, the probabil-
ity is virtually the same across the three policies, despite the very different emissions
control rate under business as usual compared with those under the two abatement
policies. This can be attributed to two causes. First, climate damage can be so large
as to drive consumption growth negative, irrespective of the emissions controls put in
place.12 Second, our assumption of a normally distributed initial growth rate of TFP
11Using Nordhaus’ (2008) standard values for DICE’s variables and parameters.
12In fact, Figure 1 shows that aggressive initial emissions abatement along the 1.5 CO2 policy path
actually makes matters worse for a time, as the high initial cost of abatement drives consumption
growth negative earlier than under the other two policies in one of the 1000 draws.
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makes it possible that TFP falls and takes consumption per capita with it. However,
what Figure 1 clearly shows is the pay-off to abatement in the 22nd century, when
the probability of falling consumption increases significantly under business as usual,
while remaining broadly steady under the 2 CO2 and 1.5 CO2 abatement policies.
4.1 Welfare evaluation of emissions cuts
Table 2 goes on to examine what these underlying estimates of consumption per
capita mean for SDU and DU welfare.
Before we explain the results, a few words are in order about our measure of
welfare changes. In computing social welfare according to SDU and DU, we obtain
the value of the two abatement policies compared with business as usual in terms
of social welfare, measured in utils. We need to express the change in social welfare
due to abatement in consumption-equivalent terms, in order to quantify willingness
to pay. However, matters are complicated by the very large changes in social welfare
we must contemplate as a result of the risk analysis (e.g. in a future contingency
where climate damage is severe under business as usual, but can largely be avoided
by abatement). We cannot simply normalise the change in social welfare using the
(inverse of the) marginal social welfare of a unit of consumption,13 because the welfare
change may not be marginal, so that the first-order approximation of the utility
function may be poor. Therefore we turn to the stationary equivalent consumption,
a concept which, following Weitzman (1976), is a standard way of representing social
welfare in dynamic settings and which we have already discussed in Section 2.14
Table 2 displays our estimates of the stationary equivalent consumption of the
2 CO2 and 1.5 CO2 abatement policies, compared with business as usual, according
to both SDU and DU. We report the mean estimate, i.e. the expected change in the
stationary equivalent, and also indicate the nature of the underlying distribution of
the change in the stationary equivalent by reporting both the 5th and 95th percentiles.
13Whereby 1
U′ ∆W is our welfare change measure in consumption-equivalent terms, where ∆W
is the change in social welfare according to either SDU or DU between one of the two abatement
policies on the one hand and business as usual on the other.
14We could instead have applied the balanced growth equivalent (BGE) introduced by Mirrlees
and Stern (1972). The BGE of a given amount of social welfare is the initial level of consumption
per capita, which, if it grows at a constant annual rate over all time, yields the same amount of
social welfare. However, as Anthoff and Tol (2009) show, the stationary equivalent consumption
gives the same result as the BGE (independently of the choice of growth rate), provided the utility
function exhibits constant fluctuation/risk aversion.
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Table 2. Change in expected stationary equivalent
of 2 CO2 and 1.5 CO2 policies compared with
business as usual, according to SDU and DU.
Abatement SDU DU
policy 5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95%
2 CO2 -0.13 4.70 0.72 -0.14 0.20 0.67
1.5 CO2 -1.69 3.83 0.51 -1.70 -0.67 0.41
The utility discount rate ρ in these calculations is 0.02, thus the per-period (i.e.
decadal) discount factor is ∼ 0.82, and the coefficient of fluctuation/risk aversion
is set to two. For these (and all subsequent) calculations, we use the full modelling
horizon from 2005 to 2395. The savings rate for this part of the analysis is exogenous
(set at 0.22 or 22%), enabling us to thoroughly explore parametric uncertainty by
diverting computing resources to a large Latin Hypercube sample (1000 draws),
rather than optimal control of savings.15 In the next section, however, where we
consider optimal emissions control, savings are a choice variable.
The table contains our core result, showing that willingness to pay for emissions
abatement is significantly larger under SDU than under DU. For the 2 CO2 policy,
the expected increase in the stationary equivalent is 4.7% under SDU, over twentyfold
higher than the corresponding estimate of 0.2% under DU. For the 1.5 CO2 policy,
the expected increase is 3.83% under SDU, but -0.67% under DU. Intriguingly, this
policy reduces social welfare according to DU, but according to SDU it increases it.
These results follow directly from the finding, detailed in Figure 1, that consumption
is more likely to fall under business as usual than under either of the two abatement
policies. SDU places greater value on these policies than DU as a consequence: they
are more likely to guarantee sustainability, defined as non-decreasing wellbeing.
What Table 2 also shows is the influence of uncertainty, specifically the small
number of random draws in which climate damage is severe. This is evident in
comparing the expected change in the stationary equivalent with the 95th percentile
change under SDU. For both policies, the expected change is in fact greater than the
15In our multi-parameter risk analysis, adding a choice variable increases computational demands
hugely. Nordhaus claims that the results of DICE simulations with a constant 22% savings rate
are virtually identical to results with endogenous savings, for DU and standard parameter values.
Fankhauser and Tol (2005) also show that endogenising the savings rate makes little difference to
the economic impact of climate change.
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95th percentile, indicating that a few random draws (less than 5%) have a change
in the stationary equivalent so large as to drive the expectation above the 95th
percentile. This is one way of showing that concerns about intergenerational equity
and concerns about uncertainty are closely linked in the context of climate change.
Figure 2 explores the sensitivity of the expected change in the stationary equiva-
lent as estimated under both SDU and DU to ρ. We examine values for ρ ∈ (0, 0.05)
(corresponding to a range for the decadal discount factor of 1–0.62). It is evident
that, in line with the distribution of near-term abatement costs and longer-term ben-
efits, the expected change in the stationary equivalent of the two abatement policies
is a decreasing function of ρ, both under SDU and under DU. Indeed, it falls rapidly
as ρ is initially increased from 0.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
However, what is more interesting is that the expected change in the stationary
equivalent under SDU holds up to a greater extent than under DU, so that the dif-
ference between the two evaluation principles grows. When ρ = 0, the two principles
yield an identical evaluation. The reason for this can readily be seen by comparing
(w.1) and (W.1) in Section 2: when the discount factor approaches unity, the SDU
algorithm approaches the DU algorithm.16 However, as ρ increases, the two algo-
rithms can yield different results depending on the probability of falling consumption
per capita, and Figure 2 bears this out. For both policies, the expected change in the
stationary equivalent falls and eventually becomes negative under DU, but remains
positive under SDU. As ρ rises, the far-off future matters less and less under DU,
and it is in the far-off future that the benefits of abatement accrue. However, under
SDU the far-off future can continue to receive significant weight, if at some point in
time future discounted utility is below present utility. We know from Figure 1 that
this is the case.
4.2 Optimal policies
Finally, rather than evaluating exogenous policy settings, it is informative to compare
the optimal schedule of emissions abatement under SDU and DU. To do this, we
16In the limit, as ρ → 0, or equivalently, δ → 1, it follows from (w.1), (w.2), (W.1) and (W.2)
that DU and SDU welfare are determined only by the eventual constant part of 0c beyond T , where
ct = cT for all t ≥ T . Then both DU and SDU welfare become insensitive to present wellbeing, as
w(0c) = W (0c) = U(cT ), illustrating a problematic aspect of undiscounted utilitarianism.
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set ρ = 0.02, and follow Nordhaus (2008) in simultaneously solving a schedule of
emissions control rates {µt} (where for each t, µt ∈ [0, 1]) and a schedule of savings
rates {st} that determines the share of output consumed/invested (where for each t,
st ∈ [0, 1]), which together maximise the expectation of SDU and DU respectively.
Thus the emissions control rate is a number between 0 and 1, which controls the
emissions intensity of output, and a control rate of µt results in a fraction 1− µt of
output contributing to emissions.
In an integrated assessment model such as DICE, and especially in running risk
analysis, solving this optimisation problem is a non-trivial computational challenge.
However, we are able to find a solution using a genetic algorithm (Riskoptimizer)
and with two modifications to the basic optimisation problem.17 In addition, we take
a smaller Latin Hypercube Sample of 250 draws.18 Figure 3 presents the schedule
of optimal emissions abatement corresponding to SDU and DU. It can be seen,
intuitively, that emissions abatement is at least as high under SDU as it is under
DU in every time period, and is considerably higher in some, specifically in the
latter half of this century and in the next (top panel). The bottom panel also brings
out the differences between the two sets of optimal controls, but it further shows
that, nevertheless, optimal annual emissions are increasing under SDU and DU for
at least the next one hundred years (albeit much less than under business as usual,
given the control rates). This is explained by our choice of ρ = 0.02, which favours
less aggressive strategies of emissions control, all else equal. Setting ρ closer to zero
would see the flow of emissions peaking earlier, under DU and especially under SDU.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
17First, we only solve µt from 2005 to 2245 inclusive, rather than all the way out to 2395. This
considerably reduces the scope of the optimisation problem, in return for making little difference
to the results, since, in the standard version of DICE, µt = 1, t > 2245 (i.e. abatement yields
high benefits relative to costs in the far-off future). Our own results also show that µt → 1 as
t → 2245. Second, we guide the optimisation by imposing the soft constraint that µt is non-
decreasing everywhere (via an exponential penalty function when µt decreases between any two
time periods). Otherwise, the algorithm struggled to find a path towards the global maximum. As
a soft constraint, the penalty does not enter the welfare evaluation. We were able to verify that the
algorithm’s best solution satisfied the property of non-decreasingness in µt, and that no solution
was found which returned higher SDU/DU, where µt was decreasing at any point.
18In order to ensure comparability with the results of Section 4.1, the smaller sample is calibrated
on the sample statistics of the larger sample.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have introduced sustainable discounted utilitarianism (SDU) as an
alternative criterion to discounted utilitarianism (DU) for the evaluation of climate-
abatement policies and we have conducted a risk analysis with the DICE integrated
assessment model in order to find out how much the switch matters empirically. To
set the stage for this application, we first extended the concept of SDU to variable
population and uncertainty (specifically risk). On the back of recent controversies, we
also adjusted the climate sensitivity and damage function used in the standard DICE
model, as part of our wider risk analysis. The result is that, with our alternative
specifications, there is a non-negligible probability that some generation is better off
than its descendants due to the impacts of climate change.
In expectations and at an aggregate level, integrated assessment models like DICE
assume that the future will be much better off than the present, due largely to
the assumption of positive growth in total factor productivity. In our empirical
analysis we have exploited the possibility that in contingencies where the climate
sensitivity is large (so that the increase in atmospheric CO2 leads to a large rise in
temperature) and temperature rise leads to large damages, development of wellbeing
may not be monotonically increasing. When such circumstances are assigned positive
probability, SDU more than DU promotes present action against climate change,
as our analysis has shown. Hence, moving from DU to SDU matters empirically.
Furthermore, this result is robust in the sense that the difference between DU and
SDU remains substantial even if a high utility discount rate is applied (we looked at
rates up to 5% per annum).
This last observation is particularly significant. In the introduction, we found
ourselves agreeing with the arguments of Arrow, Dasgupta, Rawls and others that
the use in climate-policy evaluation of undiscounted utilitarianism, or similarly the
use of DU with a near-zero utility discount rate, leads to unappealing transfers of
wealth from the present to the future, when applied consistently across the wider
set of investment opportunities. Our analysis shows that concern for the wellbeing
of future generations might be better taken into account using SDU with a positive
utility discount rate substantially away from zero. What precisely that rate should
be, when used alongside SDU, ought to be the focus of a renewed discussion, which is
beyond the scope of this paper. In any case, we have shown that, within a relatively
broad range, tough emissions abatement schedules will continue to increase social
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welfare.
At a spatially disaggregated level, climate change may lead to reduced wellbeing
(even when compared to present wellbeing) for certain groups, but not for others.
Provided that large-scale compensation schemes will not be undertaken, this applies
in particular to those living in geographical areas where climate change is likely to
be especially severe, and/or where vulnerability is particularly high. One example is
likely to be marginal agricultural regions in Africa; another may be low-lying coastal
communities in South and Southeast Asia. At such a disaggregated level, it will
matter much more to apply SDU instead of DU, as SDU in effect does not discount
the utility loss due to climate change for those groups that are so severely affected.
Therefore, it will be of great interest to apply the SDU criterion (or a similar
criterion – extended rank-discounted utilitarianism – proposed by Zuber and Asheim,
2011) for evaluating climate change in models where effects are disaggregated on
groups, and compare DU to alternative criteria in such a setting. We will turn to
this in future work. However, even the present analysis is strongly indicative of the
importance of broadening the basis of climate-policy evaluation from DU to SDU
and beyond.
Finally, we should comment on the prospect that SDU might actually be applied
in policy-making. SDU is the outcome of an explicitly ethical approach to policy
evaluation (and within that, an axiomatic approach). As such, one is challenged
to adopt an impartial perspective on questions of intergenerational distribution. In
reality of course, the present generation – seen as one of a series of non-overlapping
generations – enjoys the autonomy to make its own decisions, and the incentive
to behave self-interestedly is strong. From a positive point of view, undiscounted
utilitarianism can be criticised for this reason: there is plenty of evidence to show
that the utility of future generations is discounted at some substantially positive
rate, despite ethical objections. However, our conviction is that the case for DU
depends in large part on the assumption that the future will be better off than the
present for certain, such that if the present generation believed its decisions could
leave the future worse off than it, it could be persuaded to revise those decisions.
Hence we do believe that the criterion of SDU might capture important aspects of
the present generation’s evaluation of climate policies, and other policies where the
sustainability of wellbeing is under threat.
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Figure 1: Probability of falling consumption per capita for three emissions abatement
policies (business as usual, 2 CO2 and 1.5 CO2).
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Figure 2: Expected change in stationary equivalent consumption per capita under
SDU and DU as a function of the utility discount rate, for the 2 CO2 (top) and 1.5
CO2 (bottom) policies.
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Figure 3: Optimal emissions under SDU and DU in terms of (top) the emissions
control rate and (bottom) mean annual industrial CO2 emissions.
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